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Abstract ~  Reciprocal  trade  agreements, usually known under the generic  name of countertrade I'CT) have 
been traditionally  seen as a fiwm of bilateralism,  and thus as an inefficient  fi~nn of international  e,tchange. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reciprocal  tr,tdc agrecnzctzts such  as coutztertrade  represent  a particular  kitzd  of institntiotzal 
arraflgenlent.  A  countcrtradc  agreell|ell|  has  heetz defhtctl  as  "'an  htternathmal  comnterei;tl 
operation  in the f'ranlcwork  of which the seller has to accept  itt partial or total settlctttent of his 
deliveries the supply of products conting from the purchasing country" (OECD. 1981 ). In a world 
where most econotnic transactions involve either an actual or an electronic exchange of money 
for products, there would seem to be little place for countertradc. "'tile most venerable fiwnl of 
exchange:  a  trade of one  item  for :mother" (tlammond.  IgqO, p.  2).  h  has  been estimated, 
however, that at least between 10 and 20e,~ of total world mlde may be characterized as reciprocal 
trade (Hennart and Anderson.  1993,  p. 6) and this proportion is still growing (Czinkota et al.. 
1989, p. 494), apparently challenging the economic presumption that barter is less efficient than 
money-for-god,Is transactions. 
Not all countries, however, demand compensation under the same circu,nstances: each type 
ofcountertrade can assume different patterns and is most likely to be motivated by different fac- 
tors, since countertrade includes contracts of very different kinds,  from simple barter to offset 
transactions. The term countertrade is therefore used to describe a variety of trade practices that 
can be categorized under two main headings: 
(I)  Barter and barwr-(vpeforms (e.g. switch trading and clearing arrangements): One contract. 
no money used and a long-term orientation that involves the swap of one or more products 
for other g~x)ds of similar value. 
{2)  Other countvrtradeforms, where money or credit are inwdved, such as: 
•  CounterpurHtase:  The exporter undertakes the purchase of goods and services from the 
country/company concerned. There are two separate contracts, the principal one normally 
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l. INTRODUCTION
Rt:l:iprol:al trade agreemerlls Slll'h as l:ountertrade represent a partinJlar kind of institutional
arrangelllent. A l:ollntertrade agreement has heen dcfinl'd as "an intcrnational l:olllmerl:ial
opcration in the fralllework 01' whieh the seller has to al:l:ept in partial or total sellklllent 01' his
dcliverit:s the supply 01' prodm;ts l:oming fmm the purdwsingwunlry" (OECD. IlJX I" In a worlJ
where mostel:onomil: lransal:lions involve either an adual or an c1edronil: exchangc 01' tIloney
for pmducts. there woulJ seem to he lillk p(¡\l:e for l:olltllertmde. "lhe tIlost venerahle lilrm 01'
eXl:hange: a tmde of unt: item for anolher" (llalllmono. IlJl)(). p. 2" " has heen estilllatt:d.
huwevcr. that at least between 10 anJ 2lJl',i 01' lotal world lraJe may he dl¡lral:lt:rized as reciprocal
trade (Hennart and Anoersun. IlJlJ3. p. 6) and lhis pmportion is still growing (Czinko!a et a/.,
1989. p. 494). apparently l:hallenging the ewnolllie prcsumption that harter is less eflicient than
money-for-goods tmnsal:tions.
Nut all coulllries. however. demand l:OI11pensation unJer tht: same cirl:ulllstanl:es: eaeh type
ofcuuntertrade can assume different palterns and is mosllikcly to be motivated by different fac-
torso sinee counlertrade indudes contral:ts of very different kinos. fmm simple bartcr to offset
transactions. The tt:rm l:ountertrade is thercfore used to oescrihe a variety of trade praeticcs that
can be catcgorized under two main headings:
(1) Barreram/ barter-r.\j1l·form,l' (e.g. switch trading ano dt:aring arrangements): One l:Ontract.
no mOI/('Y used anJ a long-term oriemalion thal involves the swap 01' one ur more products
for other goods ofsimilar value.
(2) OtJ¡er cmmterrradl'form.I·. where money oraeJil are involved. such as:
• COItllrapurciulSt,: The exporter undertakes the purchase of goods ¡md services from lhe
country/company conl:erneo. There are two separatt: contracts. the prindpal ont: normally
paid for in cash orcredit and the second in goods.
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•  Compensation:  Includes trade arrangements that are long-term in  nature  and consist of 
separate but linked money-for-goods contracts. 
•  Bray-Back: A form w'here the exporter transfers technology, and agrees to purchase in return 
some of the plant's output over a given number of years. 
•  Off  vet: The seller ham to agree to subcontract some of the production to local producers, to 
increase its imports or to transfer technology. 
Contemporary  trade  theories,  however,  do  not  fully  explain  reciprocal  trade,  since  until 
recently the analysis of the contracts and institutions that govern it have been neglected (Matin 
and Schnitzer. 1995, p. 1049).  Most international economists consider countertrade irrational and 
inefficient, or they see it as the result of government-imposed restrictions on trade and foreign 
exchange (see Hennart, 1993).  In part this explanatory failure results from misconceptions about 
the different forms of countertrade and the polar question of internalization of transactions and 
market contracting. 
In this paper we shall develop some theoretical elements for analysing the decision path for 
choosing fornls for international  trade, by examining alternative contracting forms, and asking 
ourselves why countertrade was preferred to market contracting or internalization, Two impor- 
tant  elements  in  cotmtertrade  arrangements,  namely  flexibility, or the  adaptive capability to 
switch from one trade or partner to another, and  the tying of the two transactions to create a 
"hostage" (Williatuson,  1983), will bc tile key to our analysis. 
Following this  introductory part. and  in addition  to a theoretical discussion, the paper first 
introduces an analysis of the economic rationale l\lr coutltct'tr,itle, inclutlitlg the asyn|tnetries of 
inl'~rttmtion and transaction-cost theory franlewotks. Subsctlttetllly. a conceptu,tl model analyses 
cottntcrtradc as a hybrid form between the market and the hierarchy, and exatnincs the choice of 
cotmterlr:tde as a strategic trading l't~rtn. The last section then provides a suunmary and some con- 
chtding remarks. 
2. I:,CONOMIC RATIONAI,E FOR COUNTERTRADI", 
Alnong tile oldest and most  fundanlenlal qtleslions ill econon|ics are th~se regarding tile use 
of media of exchange iu intern:ttional  tr:innactions. Traditional economic  theory  addresses the 
role and use of a Inediuin of exchange to avt+id trade frictions and proposes, essentially, thai if 
nloney exists as a nleans of exchange, then barter appears irrational. Therefore, "'ironically, what 
we call  "ltllern:ttional Trade'  is, in most  instances, a cash transaction and "Coulitertrade'.  oddly 
enough, is vvll:.tt trade really nle:tns in essence: an exchange of goods without the use of the cur- 
rcncy'" (tlatmuond.  1990, p. 2). 
The analysis of countertradc  hlts usually been conducted by means of traditional economic 
theory, albeit based on simplified assutuptions of perfect infl~rnlation*.  Economic analysis works 
in an idealized world where economic systctns run st|loothly, and decisions regarding economic 
organization arc based on production and/or distribution costs which can be easily identified. If 
economic IYiction in the form of transaction costs exists, then the explanatory power of traditional 
economic  analysis  is  weakened  since  real-w'orld  situations  do  not  always  match  economic 
prcdictitms. 
*Theurctical m~J¢ls of tr;id¢ ;,re alway~ ha~..ed  on siniplifying a~.,,umptilms.  Tile ¢ondilmn of I~:rl'cct infi~rmati~m  ix)~.lu- 
luted in tile the~ dl~s m~l emerge sp.mtaneously,  as most markets arc impcrt'~ct  to begin with (Scimvsky. Igt~)). 
• Compl.'nsarÍtm: Ineludes trade arrangements that are long-term in nature and consist of
separate hut linked money-for-goods contracts.
• Bl/y-Back: A form where the exporter transfers technology. and agrees to purchase in retum
sorne 01' the plant"s output over a given nurnher 01' years.
• OJj:~l.'r: The sdler has to agree to subcontract sorne 01' the production to local producers, to
increase its imports or to transfer technology.
Contemporary trade theories. however. do not fully explain rel'iprocal trade. since until
recently the analysis 01' the contracts and institutions that govem it have been neglected (Marin
and Schnitzer. 1995. p. I0~9). Most intemational economistsconsidercountertrade irrational and
inefticient. or they see it as the result of govemrnent-imposed restrictions on trade and foreign
exchange (see Hennart. 1993l. In part this explanatory failure results from misconceptions about
the different forms of countertrade and the polar question of intemalization of transactions and
market contracting.
In this paper we shall develop sorne theoretical elements for analysing the decision palh for
choosing fomls for international trade. by examining altemalivc contracting forms. and asking
ourselves why countertrade was preferred to market contracting or internalization. Two impor-
tant e1ements in countertrade arrangements. narnely tlexibility. or the adaptive capabilily to
switch from one trade or partner to another. and lhe lying of lhe two transactions to create a
"hostage" (Williamson. 19S3). will he lhe key to our analysis.
Following lhis introdm:tory part. and in addilion to a theoretical disl·ussion. the paper lirsl
introduces an analysis of lhe economic ralionale for countcrtrad\.'. induding thc asymmclrics of
information amI transaetion-cost thcory frameworks. Suhscllucntly. a conceptualmodel analyses
countertrade as a hyhrid form helwe\.'n the market mld the hierarchy. ami examines the choice of
countertradc as a stratcgic lrading form. The last section thcn providcs a summary and some con-
cluding remarks.
2. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR COUNTERTRADE
Among the oldest and most fundamcntalllueslions in economics are those n:g~'rding the use
of media 01' exchange in international trans~lctions.Traditional economic theory addresses lhe
role ami use of a mcdium of cxchange to avoid lradc friclions and proposes. csscnlially. thal if
rnoncy cxisls as a mcans ofcxchangc. lhcn harler appears irraliona\. Thcn.:fore. "ironically, whal
wc call 'Inlernalional Tradc' is. in mosl insl~lI1ccs, a eash lrans~'clion and 'CounlerlraJe', odJly
enough. is whal lrade n:ally I1I1.:ans in csscnce: an exchange ofgoods WilhoUI lhe use oflhe cur-
rcncy" (Hal1UllonJ, 1990, p. 2l.
The ~lI1alysis of eounlerlraJe has usually bcen eonJucled by means of traJitional economic
thcory. albcit hascd on simplificd assumptions ofperfc.:et inforrnation*. Economie analysis works
in an ilh:alil.cd worlJ whcrc cconomic syslems run smoothly. and dcl'isions reg~lrding economic
organil.ation ~lrc haseJ on prodm:tion and/or distrihution eosts which can be easily identilied. If
economic friction in the form oftransaetion costsexisls, then the explanatory poweroftraditional
economic analysis is weakened since real-world situations do not always malch economic
predictions.
·Theon:li.:aIIllIKlcls orIr"Je are "lw¡IYs haseJ on silllplifying :"sumplilllls, nle cOIIJilion ofpcrfccl infurl11alion p'''IU-
laleJ illlhe lheory Joes nol emerge sp"l1l:ll1eously. as mosll11"rkels "re illlpcrrel'llo hcgill wilh IS.:ilovsky. )I)l)()).COUNTERTR.~d~E  AND STRATEGIC TRADING FORM  105 
For such a market to be perfect, most of its members on the buying and selling sides would have 
to compete knowledgeably, and to do so they would have to assemble all the necessary informa- 
tion. Moreover. this assumption not only simplifies reality but also distorts it. because market- 
relevant knowledge is not randomly distributed among market participants, but in most cases is 
biased in favour of one or the other side. Such a bias has a great impact on market behaviour and 
trade outcomes, and the resulting relationship is a well-known asymmetrical market situation.* 
Although  reciprocal trade is widely held to be uncompetitive, some authors regard it more 
favourably. To explain countertrade satisfactorily, the economic motivation for this preference 
needs to be revealed. An examination of the trading  parties"  incentives for bypassing money 
mediation suggests that. as the traditional case against barter was presented in the context of a 
closed economy, the extension of the argument to international trade implies that all trading part- 
ners should have equal access to the media of exchange and information. If this is not so. the 
theoretical case against barter does not hold up. and we are back to the basic tenet that some alter- 
native  form of reciprocal trade  will  arise.  As Stigler (1969.  p.  39)  pointed out  "the case for 
reciprocity arises when prices cannot be freely varied to meet supply and demand conditions. 
Here reciprocity restores flexibility of prices". 
Reciprocal trade arrangements are often seen as a means of solving foreign exchange short- 
ages when countries~customers have difficulty in obtaining trade credits, and most explanations 
of countertrade suggested in the descriptive literature ascribe the increasing importance of reci- 
procal trade to the high indebtedness of countries. Hennart ( 1989. pp. 13 I-I 32) has shown, how- 
ever. that this is not generally true. and has in arly case limited explanatory power. Perhaps only 
sinlple barter and barter-like contracts under specific tend;lions  have this property, since they 
luay not involve cash transactions of any kind (Banks.  1¢)83). Other countcrtrade ft)rnlS, such as 
conlpensation, counterpurchase and buy-back, which represent nlorc than half of all countertrade 
transactions, tit) not help in solving a country's shortage of hard currency, and ;ire more likely to 
be motivated by additional l~lctors.'l" 
l~nlpirical  results  (|lenllart.  1990;  Caves and  Marin,  1992;  ||¢nnart  and  Anderson.  1993) 
suggest that countcrtrade occurs in situations where the superiority of market-mediated transac- 
lions is not well established, either because of asynlnlctric infornlation or imperfect (distorted) 
competition. For both parties to countertradc there must therel'orc bc compatible economic incen- 
tives to forego ordinary market alternatives. [n the absence of these factors, countertrade would 
perhaps be replaced by money-mediated transactions in the form of commodity trade, forward 
sales, foreign direct investtnent (FDI) and other fornls of internalization. 
hi  many (regulated  and  developing  ) econoinies,  nlarkct  imperfections are  the  norln  and 
business skills are often scarce, while It)reign exporters face nlany restrictions and a lack of infor- 
nlalion  on  the  business  environtnent  and  the  quality  of goods. We  will  see  that  under  these 
circumstances countertrade may lead to transactions that would otherwise not occur. Studies by 
Hennart (1989)  and  I-lcnnart  and Anderson (1993).  which also focus on transaction costs as a 
rationale for CT, test the hypothesis that CT is a second-best alternative to direct foreign invest- 
luent by h)oking at country data. They find supporting evidence that CT is more frequently used 
by countries which restrict FDI. Their tests are based on 39 and 84 observations respectively. 
*For a more dclaih:d -',pproaeh (L) the problcm.~ derived from quality uncertainty and the .-,.,,ymmclric information of buy- 
er~, and sellers. ,~: Akt:rlof (1970). 
"i'Non-price  situation.~,  like: countcrtradc, can thcrcfor~ assume m~my form~, and consist in elfeting a great  varicly  of 
linked Irun~¢lions. including ~:uuranlics and warranties thal combine lhc advantages of added information at a lower 
in~,uranc~  C[)sl. 
Forsuch a market to be ~rfect. mostofits members on the buying and selling sides would have
to compete knowledgeably. and to do so they would have 10 assemble aH the necessary informa-
tion. Moreover. this assumption not only simplifies reality but a1so distorts it. because market-
relevant knowledge is not randomly distributed among market participants. but in most cases is
biased in favour ofone or the other side. Such a bias has a great impact on market behaviour and
trade outcomes. and the resulting relationship is a well-known asymmetrical market situation.*
Although reciproeal trade is widely held to be uncompetitive. some authors regard it more
favourably. To explain countertrade satisfactorily. the economic motivation for this preference
needs to be revealed. An examination of the trading parties' incentives for bypassing money
mediation suggests that, as the traditional case against barter was presented in the context of a
c10sed economy. the extension ofthe argument to intemational trade implies that all trading part-
ners should have equal access to the media of exchange and information. If this is not so. the
theoretical case against barterdoes not hold up. and we are baek to the basic tenet that sorne alter-
native form 01' reciprocal trade will arise. As Stigler (1969. p. 39) pointed out "the case for
reciprocity arises when priees cannut be freely varied to meet supply and demand conditions.
Here reciprocity restores tlexibility ofprices".
Reciprocal trade arrangements are often seen as a means of solving foreign exchange short-
ages when countrieslcustomers h¡¡ve difficulty in obtaining tmde credits. and most explanations
ofcountertrade suggested in the descriptive lilerature ascribe the ¡ncreasing importance ofreci-
procallmde to the high indebtedness 01'countries. Hennart (191\9. pp. IJ1-132) has shown. how-
ever. Ihat this is not generally true. and has in any case limiled explanalory power. Perhaps only
simple barter and barter-like contmcts under specifie condilions have Ihis properly. since Ihey
ImlY not involve cash trans¡u:tions 01' ¡my kind (Banks. 191\3l. Olher countertmde fúnns. such as
eompensalion. counlcrpurchase and buy-bad. which represenlmore tlUlo h¡t1f 01'all couolertrade
transaclions. do 001 hdp in solving a couolry's shorlage ofhard currem:y. ¡lIId are more likcly to
be moliv¡lled by mldition¡t1 f¡IClors.·~
Empirical results (Hennart, IlJlJü; Caves and Marin. 1992; Henoart and Anderson. 19lJ3l
suggesl Ihal counh:rlrade occurs in silualions where Ihe supcriorily 01' nwrket-medialed transac-
lions is not well established. eilher because 01' asymmetric infunnalioo ur impcrfcct (dislorted)
competition. For bolh parlies to counlertrade there musl thcrefore be compatibleeconomic incen-
tives to forego ordilwry market altematives. lo the absence 01' tbese faclors. countertrade would
perhaps be repbced by money-medíated transactions in the form 01' comrnodity trade. forwan.l
sales. foreign direct investment (FDI) amI other forms 01' inlernalization.
In many (rcgulated and devclopiog ) ccooomies. market impcrfeclions are the nonn aod
business skills are onen scarce. while foreign exporlers face many reslriclions aod a lad 01'infor-
malion 00 the business environment and the qualily 01' goods. We will see that under these
cin:urnstanccs counlertrade may lead to transactions Ihat would otherwisc not occur. Studies by
Hennart (19X9) aod Hennart and Anderson (1993). which also focos on Iraosaction cosls as a
ralionale for CT. test the hypothesis that CT is a second-besl alternative to direcl forcign invest-
l1\enl by looking at country data. They find supporting cvideoce that CT is more frequently used
by countries which restrict FDI. Thcír tesis are based on 3lJ and ~4 obscrvalions respcctivcly.
·Fora more oelailco apprua~h lolhe prohlems oeriveo frolll (jualily UlIl·c:rt.tinly ano Ihe asymmelric infnrmalion ofhuy-
ers allo sdkrs. see Akerlnf (1970).
tNon-pricc silualiuns. Iike ~ounlertraoe. can lherefon: assume many fomls ano consisl in offcring a grcal varicly uf
Iinkeo Iransaclions. induoillg guaranlics and warranlics lhal cUlllhinc Ihe aovanlages uf aodeo infomlaliun al a lowc:r
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Mirus and Yeung (1986)  used transaction-cost theories in  an attempt to explain reciprocal 
trade. Defining eountertrade an a "'double coincidence of wants". "'an incentive contract-output 
with quality dimension" and "'a differentiated product used as an input by the technology sup- 
plier", they showed that the lack of foreign exchange wax. at best, a partial and somewhat super- 
ficial explanation. The authors concluded that these arrangements did not necessarily imperfec- 
tions, and resorting to countertrade may be a reflection of the high transaction and search costs 
faced by a trader when trying to market goods. 
Further friction arises when goods are of uncertain quality, and when agents have different 
information about this quality. In this case some agents will make trade contingent on some infor- 
mation  which  they cannot  observe. This creates an  incentive  problem, which  in  turn  makes 
implicit credit arrangements difficult without a medium of exchange. 
Murrell (1982) used market signalling theory to show that eountertrade could solve problems 
that arose when the quality of foreign goods was unknown. He concluded that countertrade prac- 
tices were particularly useful when a country has a poor reputation for quality, and when the infor- 
mation about the specific quality of products, which  was important to the buyer, could not be 
obtained directly (here intermediatc trading companies play a leading role). Predictions were sup- 
ported by empirical tests based on data from more than 400 contracts. 
There are two large areas of theoretical uncertainty surrounding countertrade and other recip- 
rocal trade arrangements which this article will explore. The first in to account for the existence 
and use of countertrade its an intermediate (hybrid) arrangement. The contemporary theory of the 
firm emphasizes the cross-subslitutibility of firms and markets as organizational modalities, but 
it does not easily explain intermetli:tlc organizations.* The second major area of inqniry pursued 
here is an account of how ct)untertr:ttle  agreemenls maintain their economic rents and stability. 
given the absence of legal-institutional SUl~ports. 
3. TllF INSTITtJTI()NAI.  FRAMi:.WOI~,K 
While the modern theory of tlze firm has addressed the dcternzh)ants of the internalization of 
economic transactions,  a salisfactory  cxpl:mation  of partial  interl)alization  rein:fins  elusive. A 
possible explanation may be "the diflicnlties one typic:ally  finds in confronting ideal types such 
as markets and hierarchies with the empirical richness of the wide variety of means for organiz- 
ing transactions" (Collin and Larsson, 1993, p. 7). Nevertheless, since countertrade arrangements 
should not become a ealah)gue of imperfect ccnnpetition solutions in international  finance and 
trading systems, the aim of this article is to approach the economic organization of countertrade 
I'rom a comparative institutional point of view, showing tha! it is possible to construct and use a 
third (hybrid) institution:d form that is congruent with tran.saction-cost theory, while conserving 
efficiency gains generated by these specific arrangements. 
Since the time of Williamson's (1975) original fornmlation, many criticism have ben levelled 
at the transaction-cost approaeh.t The recognition tbat markets and hierarchies by no means con- 
stitute a mutually exhaustive ,set of institutional  fl)rms for governing transactions has generated 
"numerous attempts to develop alternative contracting fi~rms'" (Collin and Larsson,  1993,  p. 5). 
*Hcnnart (|~93) ha.,, ncvcrlhelcs~ argued t|zat the I~  i~)lc'~, t/rm~, and market c(mlracting, in fact de~cribe extreme and 
qtfitc rare cases. '~,'ilh n)o,~l t)rganilatitm,, f:dling St+lltc~,hcre l'~twc+t|. 
"i'Tranxactmn-cosl -'m:,lysis  is by no means the only explanathm l'(w the existence of firms.  EMcicncy  reasons may 
lead to integration, permitting  the re:,li/:.athm  of economics of scale or ,,col-,c. Firm.,, m:,y also bc established to exert 
n)onol~Jly l~V,'cr (Tiroh.'. 19~8~. 
Mirus and Yeun;! ¡ 1986l used transaction-cost theories in an atternpt to explain reciprocal
trade. Defining countertrade as a "double coincidence of wants··. "an incentive contract-output
with quality dirnension" and "a differentiated product used as an input by the technology sup-
plie{·. they showed that the lack offoreign exchange was. at best. a partial and sornewhat super-
licial explanation. The authors concluded that these arrangements did not necessarily irnperfec-
tions. and resorting to countertrade may be a retlection ofthe high transaction and search costs
faced by a trader when trying to market goods.
Further friction arises when goods are of uncertain quality. and when agents have different
informatíon about this quality. In this case sorne agents will make trade contingenton sorne infor-
mation which they cannot observe. This creates an incentive problern. which in turo rnakes
irnplicit credit arrangements difticult without a mediurn ofexchange.
Murrell (1982) used market signalling theory to show that countertrade could solve problerns
that arose when the quality offoreign goods was unknown. He concluded that countertrade prac-
tices were particularly useful when a collntry hasa poorrepulation for qllality. and when the infor-
mation aboul the specific qualily of products. whil"h was importanl lo the buyer. could not be
obtaineddin:ctly (here inlermediate trading companies playa leading role). Predictions were sup-
ported by empirical tests based on dala from more than 4()() contracts.
Therc are two large arcas oflheoreticalunccrtainty surrounding COllnlertrade and other recip-
rocal trade arrangemenls which Ihis artide will explore. The first is lo accollnt for the existence
and use ofcOllntertrade as an inlermediale (hybridl arrangemenl. The col1lemporary Iheory ofthe
finn emphasil.es Ihe cross-suoslilutioility 01" firms and markels as organil.ationalmodalities. but
il does nol easily explain inlermediate org;lI1izalions.*The second major arca ofinquiry pursued
here is an account of how counlertrade agreemenls mainlain lheir economic rents and slaoility.
given Ihe absem:e 01' Iegal-inslilulional supporls.
.t TIIE INSTITUTIONAI. ¡;RA~lEWORK
While Ihe modern Iheory 01' Ihe firm has addn:ssed Ihc dl.·h:nninanls uf Ihe internalizalion of
economic Ir;lI1sal·lions. a salisfaclory explanalion of partial inlernalil.ation remains elusive. A
pussihle explanalion may Oc "the dirtkulties one Iypically finds in confronling ideal types such
as nmrkels ;lOd hieran:hies wilh Ihe empirical richness 01' Ihe wide variely 01' means for organiz-
ing Iransaclions" (Collin and Larsson. 1993. p. 7). Neverlhcless. sincecounlertradearrangements
should not Occollle a c;llalogllc 01' irnpcrfect compeliliun solulions in international linance and
Irading sysh:ms. thc aim of Ihis artielc is lo approach Ihe cconomic organization 01' countcrtrade
from a comp;lrativc inslitutional point 01' vicw. showing thal il is possiole lo construct and use a
third (hybridl instilutional form thal is congruent with transaction-cost thcory. while conscrving
cfliciency gains gcncrated by these specilic arrangcmcnls.
Since the time ofWilliamson's ( 11.)75) original formulation. many criticism have ben levelled
at the transaction-cost approach.t The recognilion thal markctsand hicrarchics by no means con-
stitulC a mutually exh;lllstive set 01' inslilulional forms for governing transaclions has gencraled
"numeruus ;ltlempls lo devclop alternalive contracling forms" (Collin and Larsson. 1993. p. 5).
•...:nnal1 (I'I'HI has n':\"I:l1h<:l.:" argucd that lh.: Iw.. poks. firms and markct c"lllracting. in fa.:1 des.:ribe e.'lreme amI
4uilc rarc .:ascs. wilh m"sl organi/alions falling sumewhere belween.
tTransa.:liun-.:osl analysis is hy no n\l:ans lhe unly explanalion fnr lhe exislen.:e uf firms. Efli.:icn<:y rcasuns may
lead IU inlcgraliun. pcrmilling lhe reali/atiun uf e.:onlllllics uf seak ur Sl:llpc. hrms may alsu be cSlahlishcd lo exel1
monopuly powcr (Tirok. I'IXX l.COUNTERTRADE AND STRATEGIC TRADING FORM  107 
Williamson (1991), introduced the hybrid as an intermediate form between the market and the 
hierarchy, which  involves regulation,  franchising and various forms of long-term contracting. 
including reciprocal trading. 
Unified-governance and market-governance are thus poles on the organizational continuum 
proposed by the transaction-cost theories, but other organizational hybrids have also been envis- 
aged as middle-points on this continuum t Hennart.  19931 or as a third institutional  form, with 
intermediate  characteristics  between  the  market and  the  hierarchy  I Larsson,  1993).  Discreet 
transactions would then be located at one extreme, while highly centralized hierarchical transac- 
tions would be at the other, and hybrid transactions (reciprocal trade and other forms of non- 
standard contracting) would be located between them.* 
Although many hypothetical forms of organization "'never arise or quickly die out, because 
they combine inconsistent features" (Williamson,  1991, p. 271), complex arrangements such as 
joint ventures or countertrade agreements can be explained by invoking imperfect competition. 
We suggest here that countertrade is not novel, and by no means a mixed case. but that it is a dis- 
tinct type of institutional arrangement. If this is so. then following Williamson's prescription that 
organizational forms are determined by a comparison of alternative institutional  arrangements. 
we can say that the decision regarding the organizational form for coordinating international trade 
involves comparing at least three forms: (i) Market-contracting: (ii) hierarchy and (iii) interme- 
diate forms (such as counterlrade). 
In Williamson's perspective, it is this efficiency criterion -- the minimization t)l" transaction 
costs ~  which  explains  the  emergence of a  specific governance  structure.  Transaction-cost 
analysis entails an assessment of the comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring the 
completion of the task under altern,'ttive governance structures. This approach can be extended 
in  order to include  hybrid t'orn,s, but  the  basic postuhtte  remains t*nchanged:  the governance 
structure that finally emerges is the one that ininin)izes transaction costs. 
Transaction-cost theory has bccn applied tt) many different btlsincss areas, and in this context 
appears particularly relevant to the study of the role of countcrtr:tde and other complex trading 
forms in the international  business arena, since producers are likely to bc concerned about the 
extent of the difficulties and costs inw)lved in selecting, negotiating, managing and controlling 
intermediaries  in  servicing foreign  markets, which  may bc remote and complex (high  uncer- 
tainty) and which require specialized knowledge and investments (high asset specificity). 
Generally. the main determinant taken into account is asset-specificity (the level of uncertainty 
is assumed in some way). Consequently, agreements are supposed to minimize transaction costs 
when the degree of asset-specificity is h)cated at an intermediary level. The underlying argument 
is that countertrade agreements combine some of the advantages of the market (high-powered 
incentives and  less  bureaucratic  costs than  hierarchy,  but  to a  lesser degree  than  the  market 
alternative) and  the one  hand.  and  some of the  advantages of hierarchy  (in  terms of control 
instruments,  reducing opportunism and  information  flows) on the other.  This combination of 
advantages would be especially appropriate when the asset-specificity is not too high. 
Under certain circumstances producers may think that relying on exports could be advanta- 
geous in the classical sense (production costs), but prohibitive in terms o1" transaction costs. In 
Williamson's terms, they might decide to use some kind of reciprocal trade agreement, rather 
*In his earlier work, William~,on argued that hybrids could be expected to be rather rare. re~,umbling the distribution of 
real-world organizati~)ns on the continuum of two peak~, divided by a deep. broad valley. Later William,.,on revi~d hi.,, 
thinking,  acknowledging [hal the population cff complex economic organizations was far grealer than he' had earlier 
thought, and that organizational forms were much more evenly distributed. 
Williamson (1991), introduced the hybrid as an intermediate form between the market and the
hierarchy, which invohes regulation. franchising and various forms of long-term contracting.
induding reciprocal trading.
Unified-govemance and market-govemance are thus poies on the organizational continuum
proposed by the transaction-cost theories. but otherorganizational hybrids have also been envis-
aged as middle-points on this continuum (Hennart. 1993) or as a third institutional form, with
intermediate characteristics between the market and the hierarchy (Larsson, 1993). Discreet
transactions would then be located at one extreme, while highly centralized hierarchical transac-
tions would be at the other. and hybrid tr.msactions (reciprocal lrade and olher forms of non-
standard contracting) would be localed between lhem.*
Although many hypothetical forrns of organizalion "never arise or quickly die out. because
they combine inconsistent fealures" (Williamson, 1991. p. 271 ). complex arrangements such as
joint ventures or countertrade agreements can be explained by invoking imperfect competilion.
We suggest here lhal countertrade is not novel. and by no means a rnixed case. but lhal it is a dis-
linct type ofinstitutional arrangement. Ifthis is so. lhen following Williamson's prescription thal
organizational forms are determined by a cornparison 01' aitemalive institutional arrangements.
we can say that the decision regarding the organizational form for coon.linaling inlernational trade
involves cornparing at least threc forrns: (i) Market-contracting: (ii) hierarchy and (iii) ¡nterme-
diale forms (such as counlertrade).
In Williarnson's perspective. il is lhis efticiency crilerion - the minimization 01' transaction
cosls - which explains lhe ernergence 01' a specilic governance slmclure. Transaclion-cost
analysis cntails an assessrnenl 01' the comparative cosls 01' planning. ad'lpting amlmonitoring lhe
completion of the lask unoer aiternalive govcrnance slruclures. This approach can be eXlended
in order to inelude hyorid forms. but lhe oasic poslulale remains lInchanged: lhe governance
struclure lhal linally emerges is lhe one lhal minimizes lransaclion cosls.
Transaclion-cosllheory has been applieo lo many differenl ollsiness arcas. ano in this context
appcars particularly relevant lo the study of lhe role of Cüllnlerlraoe ano olher complcx trading
forrns in the internalional ousiness arena. since prodllcers are likely to oe concerned aoout lhe
extent of the difliculties ano costs involved in selecling. negoliating. managing ano conlrolling
inlerrneoiaries in servicing foreign rnarkels, which may oe remole and complex (high uncer-
lainly) ano which relluire specialized knowledge ano investmenls (high asset specilicity).
Genemlly. the main determinant taken into.Iccount is assel-specificily (lhe level 01' uncertainty
is assumed in sorne way). Consequently. agreernents are supposed lo minimize transaction cosls
when the degree ofusset-spccilicity is located al un inlerrnediary level. The underlying argument
is lhal counlertrade agreemenls comoine sOl1le of lhe advantages of the market (high-powereo
incentives and less bureaucralic costs than hierarchy. but lo a Icsser degree lhan the market
alternulive) and the one hand. and sorne of the udvuntages 01' hierarchy (in terms of control
instmments, n.:ducing opportunism und informalion tlows) nn the other. This combination of
advantages would be especially appropriale when lhe assel-specilicity is not too high.
Under certain circumstances proclucers may think lhal relying on exports could be advanla-
geous in the c1assic.1I sense (production costs). bul prohibitive in terrns of trunsaclion costs. In
Williumson's terms. they might decide to use some kind of reciprocal tracle agreemcnt, rather
*In his earlie:r work. William"," argue:d \hal hybrids could be e:,pecled lo be ralher rareo resembling Ihe: dislribution of
real-world organilalions on Ihe: cominuum of IWo peaks divided by a dee:p. brnad valley. Laler Williamson revisc:d his
Ihinking. acknowledging lhal lhe: populalion of comple, economic organilalions was far gn:aler lhan he had e:arlier
lhoughl. and \hal organitalional forms were much more eve:nly dislribuled.108  D. CA.MINO and C. CARDONE 
than internalizing the export function or going to the market (i.e. through intermediaries or trad- 
ing companies). 
One  way to deter this  is  to expand the contracting  relationship from unilateral  to bilateral 
exchange. Reciprocal trading, especially when it involves product exchanges, creates credible 
commitments that are signalled without exposing assets. Both parties understand that the trans- 
action will be continued only if reciprocity is observed. Reciprocity can therefore generate ben- 
efits for the governance structure (Williamson.  1983). 
Countertrade agreements have certain features reminiscent of markets, in that the two partic- 
ipating firms continue to conduct discrete exchanges with each other, while maintaining formally 
independent roles. Nevertheless. certain organization-like features are introduced as well: con- 
tractual limits are placed on the terms of the exchange, and overall limitations are set to govern 
activity with potentially competing firms. Within  their areas of respective unilateral authority. 
the firms utilize their existing internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. A hybrid structure 
can be expected, when these conditions obtain. 
Nevertheless. one importance source of sustainable rents is "'the ability of firms to reduce the 
costs they experience in organizing both internal and external transactions below those of their 
rivals" (Hennart.  1994.  p.  193) and to this end. costs are minimized when the firm chooses the 
organizing mode that is most efficient for a given transaction. The n|inimization of transaction 
costs is thercfl~re  a criterion of efficiency which explains the emergence of specific governance 
structures,  i.e.  either market or hierarchy, although this approach may be extended to include 
intermediate hybrid fi~rms. The argument is thus that CT agreements offer prospective advan- 
tages over trnilateral trade, if tire resulting exposure of tra,lsaction-specific assets effects a cred- 
ible conmlitnlelrt arrlolrg tire partners. If such is tile case. we stlggcst that countertrz,de can reduce 
tr:lnsaction or)Ms. 
When strong uncerlainty c,~exists with ;.t high degree of assct-specil'icity, however, it is impos- 
sible  to  specify  ex-antc  the  whtdc  set  of ctmtingclrt  clauses  required  for executing  the  the 
contn, ct (bounded rationality hypothesis). Thus c()nlracts ;ire necessarily incomplete. This in turn 
generates problems of enl'~)rcement,  due tt) (~pportt, nistu ;,,nong tile agents. C(mSetlt,Cnlly  long- 
term  incomplete  ctmtracting  is  generally  characterized  by  frequent  misnndersta,ldings  and 
conflicts  which  may  lead  It) delays,  breaktl~)wns or other  inalfuxlctions.  There  are  two  main 
situations in which transaction costs are likely to be high: 
•  When there is signil]cant  infornmtion  asymmetry  between tile parties" 
•  When the market is narrow because of scale econ~)mies,  transportation costs or the need to 
make transactiem-specil'ic  investments. 
According to Larsson ( 1993, p. 99) market contracting involves costs primarily  for getting the 
products  to and from  the market.  Under conditions  of hierarchical  coordination,  on the other 
hand,  such  marketing  and  purchasing  costs  would  be  redticed  to  mere  transportation  costs, 
although there would be administrative  expenses m addition to the internalization costs that are 
usually  neglected in  transaction-cost  analysis.  In  the case of countertrade,  however, the main 
costs are related to the process of negotiation, and to achieving an agreement on a joint structure, 
as we shall see below. 
Two observations reinf~rce the idea that negotiation costs are important  in the case of coun- 
terlrade (barter) agreements. Firstly, agreements generally take the form of long-term incomplete 
contracts, which are precisely tho.~e ,suffering from strategic bargaining, conflicts and other mal- 
functions, according to Williamson.  Exhaustive contracting is too flexible and generally leads to 
than internalizing the export function or going to the market (i.e. through intermediaries or trad-
ing companiesl.
One way to deter this is to expaml the contracting relationship from unilateral to bilateral
exchange. Reciprocal trading. especially when it involves product exchanges. creates credible
commitments that are signalled without exposing assets. Both parties understand that the trans-
action will be continued only ifreeiprocity is observed. Reciproeity can therefore generate ben-
efits for the governance structure (Williamson. 19831-
Countertrade agreements have certain features reminiseent of markets. in that the two partic-
ipating firms continue to conduetdiscrcte exchanges with eaeh other. while maintaining formally
independent roles. Nevertheless. certain organization-like features are introduced as well: con-
tractuallimits are placed on the terms of the exehange. and overalllimitations are set to govern
activity with potentially competing firms. Within their arcas of respective unilateral authority.
the firms utilize their existing internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. A hybrid structure
can be expel.:ted. whcn these conditions obtain.
Nevertheless. one importanee source ofsustainable rents is "the ability of firms to reduce the
costs they expcrienl.:c in organizing both internal and external transactions below those of their
rivals" (Hennart. 1994. p. 193) and to this end. costs are minimized when the firm chooses the
organizing mode that is most efficient for a given transaction. lhe minimization of transaction
costs is then:fore a lTiterion of cfficil'llL'y whil.:h explains the eml'rgence ofspecifk governance
stnll'tures. i.c. eithcr market or hierarchy. although this appnl<ll.:h may he extended to inc!ude
intermediate hyhrid forms. The argument is thus that CT agreements oller prospective advan-
tagcs oVt:r unilateral trade. if the n:sulting exposllre oftransm:tion-specific assels effects a I.:red-
ihle commitment .ulIong the p;lrtners. Ifsudl is Ihe CISC. we sllggest thal countertrade can reduce
transaction cosls.
When strong uncertainty coexisls wilh a high degree ofassel-spel.:ifil.:ily. however. il is impos-
sihle lo specify ex-ante Ihe whole sl'l of conlingcnt c!;luses rcquired for execuling Ihe the
contract (hollnded rationality hypothesisl. Thuscontr;u:ts .Ire nel.:essarily inl.:omplete. This in turn
generates proh!ClIIs of enforl.:emenl. due to opportunislll alllong the agcnts. Consequenlly long-
terln ineomplcte contracting is gcnerally characteri/ed hy frcqllent misunderstandings and
conllicts whil.:h m.IY !cad to dclays. hre••kdowns or other lIIalfllnctions. There are two main
situations in which transaction costs are Iikcly to he high:
• When therc is signilic'lIlt information aSYlTlmetry hctween the parties:
• When the markct is narrow bccause of scalc econolllies. transportation costs or the need to
make transaction-specilic investments.
According lO Larsson (1l)l)3. p. l)l)l market eontracting involves costs primarily for getting the
products lO and from the market. Under eonditions of hierarchil.:'ll coordination. on the other
hand. such marketing and purchasing costs would be reduced to mere transportation costs.
although there would be administrative expenses in addition to the internalization costs that are
usually neglected in transaction-cosl analysis. In lhe case of counlertrade. however, the m;lÍn
costs are rclated lO the process ofnegolialion. antl lo achieving an agreemenl on ajoint slructure.
as we shall see bclow.
Two observalions rcinforce lhe idea thal negoliation cosls are important in lhe case ofeoun-
lertrade (harter) agreemenls. firslly. agrcel1lenls generally take the form oflong-lerm incomplcle
contracls, which arc preciscly those suffering from strategic hargaining, contlicts and other mul-
funclions. accon.ling to Williul1lson. Exhaustive conlracling is too tlcxihle and gcnerally leads loCOUNTERTRADE AND STRATEGIC TRADING FORM 
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Institutional  Market  Countertrade  Hierarchy 
Division of adjustment  Self-adjustment  Joint adjustment  Impo~d adjustment 
Adjustment reference  Price  Contractual agreements  Authoritative orders 
Resulting from...  Supply and demand  Negotiation  Planning 
Primary relative costs  Marketing and purchasing  Searching and negotiation  Administration Internalization 
Source: Adapted from Larsson. R. ( 1993. p. 99). 
failure. Secondly,  if  we  admit  that  the  length  of  negotiations  represents  an  acceptable 
approximation of the e.r-ante costs, then it must be recognized that the latter are especially high: 
the duration of the negotiations often exceeds one year.* 
Within countertrade transactions, however, free exchange is at least partly abandoned (per- 
haps due to concern about opportunism), but so too is total internalization. Rather, the two firms 
remain independent  in their larger missions, but operate a specific pooling of assets through a 
joint governance structure and share their claim to the resulting residual.  For transaction-cost 
theory the greater challenge is not to show which markets fail and why. but to show why a mix 
or  intermediate  stnlctnre  (such  as countertrade)  may do  more to  minimize transaction  costs 
compared to the alternative forms. 
4. THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Ifcountertrade dtr:s not appear tt) mitfimiz¢ transaction costs, i.e. it" it is less eMcient than hier- 
archy or nmrket ct)nlracting,  why dt) firms g() in for it? what  is the value of such agreements? 
HOW.  in  some  instances,  tit)  they  compensale  for  higher  transaction  costs? The  answer  is 
connected  with the v:due of having a "hostage"  in  markets under asymmetric  information  and 
possessing the  dynanlic  elements of countertrade  agreements,  as  a  way  of  attaining  future 
IYccdom of choice in unpredict:lblc or changing environments. 
Most failures to expl:,in countertrade may result from a misconception about the forms it may 
take. Hennart (1980.  p.  148),  for instance, argued that the various forms of CT are aggregated 
both  in  the()retical  discussion  and  in  empirical  work.  ahhot, gh  in  fact each one deserves an 
explanation on  it own  merits. Countertrade  agreements include  transactions of very different 
kinds, some of them with barter-like characteristics such as (i) simple barter, switch trading and 
clearing arrangements, which may be a response to fi)reign exchange shortages or asymmetric 
information problems, while (ii) other countertradc forms (e.g. buy-back, counterpurchase and 
compensation), can be regarded under certain circumstances as a  ration:d  response to market 
imperfections -- as a second-best option in a second-best world economy. 
Although some specific ex-antc transacti(m costs may be high (searching, negotiating), the ex- 
post (bonding) effects and the consequences of executing the contract are of chief interest here. 
The problem in international trade is often that the quality of the goods is either not observed by 
an outsider, or can only be verified at considerable cost. so that it cannot be specified unambigu- 
ously in a contract. The CT contract is designed in such a way that goods serve as deal-specific 
*The obscr~,.ations come from an cxaminati(~n of .~veral case studies of complex trade agreements by Llerena et uL 
(1991). 
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failure. Seeondly. if we admil lhal lhe lenglh of negoltatlOns represents an acceptable
approximalion ofthe ex-ante costs. lhen il musl be reeognized lhat the latter are espeeially high:
the duration oflhe negotiations often exceeds one year.*
Within countertrade transaetions. however. free exehange is at least partly abandoned (per-
haps due lo eoneem aboul opportunism). but so loo is total inlemalization. Rather. the two firms
remain independent in their larger missions. bUl operale a specifie pooling 01' assets through a
joint govemanee strueture and share lheir c1aim lo the resulting residual. For transaetion-eost
theory lhe greater ehallenge is not to show whieh markets fail and why. but lo show why a mix
or intermediate strueture (such as counlertrade) may do more to minimize lransaelion cosls
compared to the altemalive forms.
4. THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Ifcounlertradcdoes nol appcarlo minimize lransaclion cosls. i.e. ifil is less eflicienllhan hier-
archy or nwrkel conlracling. why do firms go in for il'! Whal is lhe value 01' such agreemenls'!
How. in some inslances. do lhey compensale for higher lransaclion eosls? The answer is
connccled wilh lhl' value 01' having a "hoslagc" in markels undcr asyrnrnelrie information and
posscssing lhe dynarnic c1crncnls 01' counlerlrade agrecmenls. as ¡t way 01' allaining fulure
frecdorn 01' choicc in unprcdiclable or changing environmcnls.
Mosl failures lo expbin counlertradc may rcsult from a misconceplion aboullhe forms il may
lakc. Hcnnarl (19!N. p. 14X). for instancc. argucd lhat lhe various forms 01' CT arc aggrcgated
bolh in theoretical diseussion and in cmpirical work. ahhough in facl each one deserves an
explanalion on il own merits. Counlertrade agrccmenls indude lransaclions 01' very different
kinds. some 01' lhem wilh barter-likc characteristics such as (i) simple barter. swilCh lrading and
dearing arrangemenls. which may be a response lo foreign cxchangc shortages or asymmctric
informalion problems. whilc (ji) othcr countertrade forms (e.g. buy-back. eountcrpurchase and
cornpensationl. can be regarded under ecrlain circurnslances as a ralional response to markct
imperfections - as a second-besl oplion in a second-beSl world econorny.
Although sorne specific ex-anle transaclion cc>sts may be high (searching. negotiating). the ex-
po.\'1 (bonding) cffecls and the eonscqucnc:cs 01' executing lhe conlract are ofehief inlerest here.
The problem in inlernational lrade is oflen thal the quality 01' the goods is eilher not observed by
an outsider. orcan only be verified al considerable eosl. so lhal il cannol be specified unambigu-
ously in a eonlract. The CT contract is designed in sueh a way lhat goods serve as deal-specific
°The n!>servalions come frum .In examinalion uf scver;¡1 case sludies of cOll1plex lrade agreemenls by L1erena el U/o
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collateral, and  their value depends of the quality  decision.  Countertrade can provide an effi- 
ciency-enhancing way of dealing with problems of moral hazard in international trade, since the 
tying together of two transactions creates a "'hostage" (Williamson. 1983 ) which may deter cheat- 
ing on quality or defaulting on the payment of the original export.* 
Commitment to the exchange is signalled more definitely by the willingness of the parties to 
accept reciprocal goods transactions. Reciprocity can serve to equalize the exposure of the par- 
ties. thereby reducing the incentive of one party to defect from the exchange, leaving the other to 
redeploy specialized assets at greatly reduced alternative value. Defection hazards are thereby 
reduced, giving the partner an incentive to fulfil its financial obligations.+ Countertrade creates 
a double moral-hazard situation, and is more likely to provide an efficient institution, the higher 
the gains from consecutive trades (Williamson.  1983). 
Williamson views the firm as one of a set of possible institutional relationships structured in 
order to reduce the hazards of idiosyncratic bargaining that  inevitably arise in various "small 
number" circumstances, such as asset-specificity and long-term contracts. While both bounded 
rationality and opportunism present difficulties, they do not necessarily lead to market failures. 
since markets represent "'large number" conditions: there are many potential buyers and sellers 
of goods which are interchangeable, the market signals the appropriate price. "Small number" 
conditions are much more hazardous. Where the pool of potential transactors is limited, one party 
can  gain  the  advantage.  Where  the exchanged  assets  are no longer obtainable  from multiple 
sources, but are unique, tension can be expected between buyers and sellers. If the seller has no 
alternative customer fi,r the product, he may be constrained to accept a price from the buyer which 
is not adcquatcly cotnpcnsated. Similarly. the purchaser may be dependent on the supplier of a 
unique or scarce asset, and significant costs and delays may be incurred if the desired good is to 
bc  obtained  from  an  altcrn:ttivc  supplicr.  Similar  dynamics  of  mutual  dependency  can  be 
observed in long-term countertrade relationships. 
Another assumption is ixnportant here, namely opportunism. If there is no opportunism, good 
laith and mutual adjustment can bc used for coordination purposes, and safeguards will be super- 
fluotts under these circumstances. Not all situations :rod individuals, however, are opportunistic 
to the s:tmc degree, "'some individuals are opp~,rtunistic and [...I differential trustworthiness is 
rarely transparent ex-a,te. As :t consequence, ex-ante screening efforts are made and ex-post sale- 
guards are created'" (Williamson,  1985 p. 64):~.. 
From the production point of view, the idea of an organization without boundaries implies the 
coordination of relations with suppliers and customers by assuming an integrated view of the sys- 
tenn. The development of institutional  trade agreements, such as countertrade, will thus help to 
reduce the risk of opportunism. Under these circumstances, buy-back, counterpurchase and other 
compensation agrcements can be seen as attempts to reduce transaction costs by providing what 
amounts to a bond or hostage. 
In CT costs are usually highly specific to the tr:msaction, and have two attributes: they are 
incurred in advance of the contemplated exchange, and their value in alternative uses or by alter- 
native users  is greatly reduced (Klein et al..  1990  used the term "'appropriable quasi-rent'" to 
*The crucial  a.ss,  umptitm underlying the analysis  presented  in this article  is that. as assets become more specific  and 
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1""Reputation  theory" suggests that a country, will n()t repudiate  its debt. if it would otherwise risk its future participation 
in the internatit)nal  trade and financial  markets. 
:~Quoted by No()rderhaven ( 1995. p, .$7). 
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Commitment to the exchange is signalled more definilely by the willingness 01' the parties to
accept reciprocal goods transactions. Reciprocity can serve to equalize the exposure 01' the par-
tieso thereby reducing the incentive 01' one party to defect from the exchange. leaving the otherto
redeploy specialized assels at greatly reduced altemative value. Defection hazards are thereby
reduced. giving the partner an in~:entive to fulfil its financial obligations.t Countertrade creates
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Williamson views the tirm as one 01' a set 01' possible institutional relationships structured in
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compensation agreements can be seen as allempls lo redlll:e transaetion costs by providing what
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In CT costs are usually highly specilic to the transaclion. and have two attributes: they are
incurred in advance 01' the conlemplaled exchangc. and thcir value in altcrnalive uses orby alter-
native uscrs is gre<ltly reduced (Klcin et l/l.• 1990 used the term "appropriable quasi-rent" 10
-11Ie: crucial assumplion unde:rlying Ihc analpis presenled in Ihis anide is Ihal. as asscls beeome more spccifi.: and
appmpriable. 4uasi.renls are crealed ((hus in.:reasing Ihe possihle gains fmm opponunislic behaviour). Ihe cosls ofmar-
kel conlracling will geoerally ¡ncrcasc more: lhan Ihe CI"ls ofcounlenr:lding.
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describe this condition). Reciprocity in these circumstances is thus a device whereby the conti- 
nuity of a specific trading relation is promoted, white also reducing risk.  In the absence of a 
"hostage" or some other assurance that the other party will not defect, the sale may never mate- 
rialize. Thus, barter may be an "inefficient" form of trade, not because of the absence of a "'dou- 
ble coincidence of wants" but as a result of asymmetric information and market inefficiencies. 
Although we explore one particular cost of using the market system -- namely the possibil- 
ity of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour m  another key dimension in this context is asset 
specificity, which refers to "the dependence created through transaction-specific investments. It 
expresses the amount of value involved in the exchange as such. This value arises from the par- 
ties having made investments in the exchange, and from the cost that would be incurred through 
ending the relation and choosing another exchange party. The second dimension is uncertainty. 
inherent in  situations in which bounded rationality makes humans incapable of predicting the 
future. The third dimension is frequency, referring to how often the transaction occurs'" (Collin 
and Larsson.  1993, p. 4). 
At this stage we are able to analyse the limitations of transaction-cost explanations in the case 
of countertrade agreements. Countertrade seems to suffer high transaction costs, partly because 
of its neglect of the flexibility aspects. The nature of the flexibility considered will be crucial to 
our analysis. Indeed. in economic theory it is usually considered that flexibility is a market char- 
acteristic: market mechanisms insure a certain kind of flexibility (through price and/or quantity 
adjustments), mainly in terms of resource allocation. Hierarchies, on the contrary, are supposed 
to be "'rigid". Rigidities are the result of bureaucratization and arc centralized decision processes, 
and linked to the size and complexity of the hierarchy. 
Flexibility is an ubiquitous and rather ambiguous concept. The kind of flexibility we are talk- 
ing about must be clearly distinguished  from the alhvcative mechanistic adjustment properties 
genendly attributed  to market transactions.  We do not argue that countertrade agreements arc 
more flexible than market transactions, but that they have some of the properties of market adjust- 
mont,  like the ability  to change  partners or dissolve the  relationship  in case of opportunistic 
bchaviour.* 
The  transaction-costs  approach  is  essentially  a  comparatively static  one:  the  institutional 
analysis assumes instantaneous optin|ization of the institutional form according to a specified set 
of determinants ~  for instance, the degree of asset-specificity ~  and the process of shifting from 
one particular form to another is not analysed. In this context a hybrid arrangement permits a more 
appropriate approach to organizational altermttives: barter and barter-like agreements may then 
appear as intermediate h~rms, more flexible than hierarchies but less th;m markets. 
Other  countertrade  arrangements  can  instead  be  used  as  devices  for  reducing  the  high 
transaction costs, which affect three types of international transactions in particular, namely the 
purchase of poorly protected technology, the sale of intermediate products under small-number 
conditions,  and the purchase of marketing services when the distributor has to make up-front 
transaction-specific investments in countries with restrictions on incoming FDI. 
A firm motivated by a desire to integrate horizontally or vertically, or to benefit from firm- 
specific advantages, would want to put its capital and technology to use in production abroad. 
However. due  to  high  proprietary costs  and  political  constraints  it  may  be  prevented  from 
*Opportunistic  behaviour  has  been identified and discussed in  modem  anal)~is  of the organization  of economic 
activity. Williamson  (1975).  for example,  has referred  to the effects  on the contracting  process of" "ex-poxt small 
numbers opportunism". 
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assuming ownership. In this situation the imperfections in the markets for capital and technology 
are not overcome by internalization, which leads to a divergence between the economic interests 
of the user and supplier of capital and technology. This problem is aggravated by the information 
asymmetry between the user and the supplier, and by the absence of future commodity markets 
in many countries and goods. 
The main alternative to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of oppor- 
tunistic behaviour is some form of economically enforceable long-term contract, such as a coun- 
tertrade agreement. Clearly a short-term (i.e. one transaction, non-repeat spot sale) contract will 
not solve the problem (Klein et al., 1990). The relevant question then concerns when the vertical 
integration, the market contracting or the countertrade transactions will occur. We will attempt 
to make a distinction between a non-price long-term contract like countertrade, and ownership, 
or market contracting. 
Non-price  long-term  contracts  used  as  an  alternative  to  market  contracting  or  vertical 
integration can be assumed to assume one of two forms: (i) an explicitly stated contractual 
guarantee legally enforced by the government or some other outside institution: or (ii) an implicit 
contractual guarantee enforced by the  market mechanism of withdrawing  future business  is 
opportunistic behaviour occurs. 
Explicit  long-term  contracts  can  in  principle  solve  opportunistic  problems  but,  as  we 
have  already  suggested,  the  solutions  are  very  costly.  Contractual  provisions  specifying 
compulsory arbitration or more directly imposing costs on the opportunistic party (for example, 
via bonding) are  alternatives  often employed to cut  down  on  litigation costs  and  to create 
flexibility  without  specifying  every  possible  contingency  and  quality  dimension  of  the 
transaction. 
Such countertradc agreements thus arise as a rational economic solution to market imperfec- 
tions caused by high ownership costs (or ownership constraints) and information asymmetry. 
This means that most of these alternative institutional  forms for countertrade can be ascribed 
features which lie between those of the market and those of the hierarchy. Buy-back, for instance, 
involves a class of international  transaction that can be  viewed as the vertical or horizontal 
integration of economic activities while retaining separate ownership, whereas offset has been 
used in government-related contracts (fighter aircraft, military supplies, etc.) largely in response 
to political factors. 
The analysis has two important implications: first, since a significant percentage of counter- 
trade transactions have little to do with foreign exchange shortages, changes in the debt situation 
of less-developed countries should have only a moderate impact on the development of counter- 
trade. Second, the future of counterpurchase, compensation and buy-back depends ion restric- 
tions on FD1 on the part of the host countries. 
Since buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase agreements probably make up more than 
half of  all  countertrade  transactions,  the  countertrade  intensity  with  a  country  should  be 
correlated with the degree to which it restricts incoming FDI. The empirical evidence generally 
confirms these observations (Hennart, 1989, p. 147). On this point the analysis links countertrade 
to existing theories of FDI. 
Countertrade can also be seen as a device for reducing the cost of arranging for the interna- 
tional marketing of products. There is clear evidence that countries imposing counterpurchase 
requirements do so in order to diversify their exports. There are two ways in which manufactur- 
ing and overseas distributions can be integrated. Manufacturers in the home market can establish 
sales subsidiaries overseas, or firms with developed distribution systems in the home market can 
establish production facilities in foreign countries. 
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Distribution services are also subject to market failure. First, there is often a small number of 
potential suppliers of distribution services. Second, there is substantial up-front investment to be 
made in developing distribution structures, which gives rise to a specific asset. Finally. distribu- 
tors have local knowledge (about their territories), on which it is difficult to set as price. 
In addition,  producers  may  feel  uncomfortable with  export  partners  who  have access  to 
sources  of  information  unavailable  to  them  selves  (asymmetric  information),  who  do  not 
necessarily enjoy the best reputation (perhaps due to past opportunism), or who are operating in 
a business environment where reliance on export intermediaries may not have been traditionally 
encouraged, in general, and particularly not by government (atmosphere). 
In order to explain the nature of the agreements as stable strategies, we use the notion of orga- 
nizational  flexibility, based on the activation of learning  activities between  the countertrade 
partners, which the transaction-costs explanations failed to consider. Such agreements are thus 
a response related to the value of the dynamic elements of countertrade agreements, as a means 
of  learning  and  enhancing  one's  future  freedom  of  choice  in  unpredictable  or  changing 
environments. Countertrade then. can be considered as a routine process for creating complex 
agreements, constituting a particular kind of institutional trading form. 
Even if reciprocal trade agreements suffer high ex-ante transaction costs due to the lengthy 
negotiations, the traditional approach to CT -- because of its neglect of the dynamic aspects a 
is unable to explain the positive value of such agreements. This line of thought thus suggests that 
barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in situations where due to information 
asymmetry, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent international trade from taking place: 
other countertradc  forms such as buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase,  on the other 
hand, will be used to avoid restrictions on exports and to deal with the problem of moral hazard 
when host countries have restrictions on FDI. 
in conclusion, thee seems to be evidence that although the negotiation costs of countertrade 
agreements are often high. such complex contracts may -- in terms of efficiency gains and orga- 
nizational tlexibility, and in the absence of equity links -- a second-best answer to the problems 
of marketing and investing in foreign markets. The analysis of countertrade has thus progressed 
from a simple situation of double coincidence of wants, to a double coincidence of information 
scarcity. It is not then necessarily an inefficient form of trade, nor is it inevitably a reflection of 
a shortage of tbreign exchange; countertrade is simply a substitute for other more standard forms 
of market trade or internalization. 
5. THE CHOICE OF STRATEGIC TRADING FORM 
Countertrade  arrangements represent only one of the options available to the exporter for 
market entry or the maintenance of market shares. There are other alternatives such as licensing, 
plant  delivery,  co-production,  subcontracting, joint-venture, joint  tendering  and  bilateral  or 
tripartite governance  forms (see  Buckley and  Casson,  1988  or Hennart,  1988).  China  is  an 
obvious example, where buy-back agreements have recently been declining with the enactment 
of joint-venture  regulations. Some countertrade  forms can  then  be seen  as  a  hybrid of joint 
venture, franchising, vertical integration and FDI under political and ownership constraints. 
The  organizational  decision  to establish  a  countertrade  transaction  can  be  more  usefully 
envisaged as a set of sub-decisions, including (i) where to locate various stages of production~ 
(ii)  where  to  locate  the  boundary  between  the  firm and  the  exterior;  and  (iii)  whether  the 
organizational boundary should be hard (market-contracting) or soft (internalization). For a host 
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of environmental and institutional reasons, these boundaries often correspond to national market 
frontiers in countertrade arrangements. 
The  decision  as  to  where  to  locate  specific  production  phases  is  dictated  by  locational 
advantages.*  Advantage may be viewed in terms of returns on productive assets. Assets --  be 
they plant, labour, or distribution channels --  which are located in economies characterized by 
comparative advantage, are more favorably priced. 
Complex  production  may  involve  distributing  production  phases  over  different  national 
territories  (that  is,  by  using  productive  assets  located  in  different  national  territories). This 
decision  corresponds  to identifying the national economy which  has a  comparative advantage 
during  a  particular  production  phase.  Alternatively  this  may  be  thought  of as  commanding 
(through "transactions") the optional set of immobile productive assets. Multinational companies 
may be particularly adept at identifying which national economy has a comparative advantage in 
a particular stage of production. 
Given that the optional organizational  structure  frequently  requires a transnational  distribu- 
tion of production,  the analysis then proceeds to the internalization/market  decision.  According 
to Williamson.  this  involves a comparative analysis of institutional  forms, with internalization 
being favoured where market transaction costs are relatively high (or equivalent, where markets 
fifil).  Similarly, given a  transnational  distribution  of production,  internalization  in the  form of 
FDI, is preferred where the firms possess firm-specific advantages which they prefer not to alien- 
ate, and countertrade  is used when these advantages are shared. 
The main aspect to emphasize is the reconfiguration of organizational boundaries. The spread 
of subcontracting  and  other  fornls of interfirm agreements  --  from joint  ventures  to strategic 
alliances -- hits developed  network form of organization its a third institutional  fonu, somewhere 
half-way between  vertical  integration  and  market contracting.  A  hybrid form of governance is 
likely to arise, its such a development may be the final outcome of a long process started from the 
polar premises of make-or-buy decisions (Williamson.  1975). 
Hybrid  governance,  with  safeguards,  corresponds  to  bilateral  or  trilateral  governance  its 
described by Williamson (1985,  1991).  "'These relationships are characterized by high levels of 
asset specificity and mutual adaptation and [... ] ciln take the I'ornl of complex contracts, speci- 
lying  arrangements  for  price  and  quantity  adjustments  .  .  .'"  (N(~)rderhaven,  1995.  p.  45). 
International  countertrade  agreements,  we  believe,  are  organizational  hybrids,  intermediate 
points on the continuum described by Williamson (I 991) ;rod others, between markets and com- 
plete integration (the unitary firm). The organizational  decision  is more complex than deciding 
whether a firm purchases a pn)ductive asset (internalization), or its output (market). We describe 
this  more complex decision  as an "access decision",  in which  internalization  is only one of a 
larger set of possibilities. 
There are situations in which CT alternatives may be beneficial to partners, because economies 
can be realized. Let us take the example of a producer of textile machinery who exports to a coun- 
try like China.  If the exporter firm agrees to take payment in the form of textile products (buy- 
back), it may reduce the risk of variability in product quality and delivery schedules (as a result 
of its own technology and management), and the Chinese may perceive a lower risk of product 
*In his "'eclectic" approach, Dunning (1988) translates the |lcckshcr-Ohlin notion of comparative advantage, which is 
an attribute of a national economy, into "'h~:ation:d advantage". Locational advantage is not directly attached to a terri- 
tory, but rather to certain pnv,  luctive assets fixed to that lerritory. The immobility of productive assets (such as lal'~mr) 
underli,,:s this notion of Iocational advantage. 
ofenvironmental and institutional rea..';ons. these boundaries often correspond to national market
frontiers in countertrade arrangements.
The decision as to where to locate specific production phases is dictated by locational
advantages.* Advantage may be viewed in terrns of returns on productive assets. Assets - be
they plant. labour, or distribution channels - which are located in economies characterized by
comparative advantage. are more favorably priced.
Complex production may involve distributing production phases over different national
territories (that is. by using productive assets located in different national territories). This
decision corresponds to identifying the national economy which has a comparative advantage
during a particular production phase. Alternatively this may be thought of as commanding
(through "transactions") the optional setofimmobile productive assets. Multinational companies
may be particularly adept at identifying which national economy has a comparative advantagc in
a particular stage ofproduction.
Given that the optional organizational structure frequently requires a transnational distribu-
tion of production, the analysis then proceeds to the internalization/market decision. According
to Williamson, this involves a comparative analysis of institutional forrns. with internalization
being favoured where market transaction costs are rclatively high (or equivalent. where markcts
fail). Simil¡¡rly. given a transnational distribution of production. internalization in the form of
FDI. is prcfcrred where lhe firms possess firm-specific advanlages which they prefer not loalien-
ate. and countcrtrade is used when these advantages are shared.
The main aspcct lo emphasize is the recontiguration oforganizational boundaries. The spread
of subcontracling and uther forms of intertirm ¡Ign:eml'nts - from joinl venlures to strategic
alliances- has devcloped network form oforganizalion as a third instilutional form, somewhere
half-way between vertical inlegration ami markct contracting. A hybrid form uf governance is
likcly lO arise. as such a devclopment m¡IY be the tinal outcome ofa long process started from the
polar premises of make-or-buy decisions (Williamson. IlJ75).
Hybrid governance. with safeguards. corresponds to bilateral or trilateral govern¡lIlce ¡IS
described by Williamson (llJ~5. IlJlJ 1). 'These rclationships are characterized by high levcls of
asset speciticity and mutual adaptation amI 1, ..1can take the rorm ofcomplex contracts. speci-
rying arrangements ror price and quantity adjustmellls ..... (Noorderhaven. Il.)lJ5. p. 45),
International countertrade agreements. we bclieve. are urganizational hybrids. intermediate
points on the continuum described by Williamson (llJlJ 1) and others. between markcts and com-
plele integralion (lhe unitary firm), The organizational decision is more complex than deciding
whether a lirm purchases a productive asset (internalization). or its output (market). We describe
this more complex decision as an "access decision". in which internalization is only one of a
largcr set of possibilities.
Thcreare situations in whichCTaIternatives may be beneficial 10 partners. becauseeconomies
can be realized. Let us take the cxampleofa produceruftextile machinery whocxports to a coun-
try likc China. Ir the exporter tirm agrecs to take paymcnt in the form of tcxtile products (buy-
back). it may reduce the risk of variability in product quality and delivcry schedules (as a result
of its own tcchnulogy and management). and the Chinese may perceive a lower risk of product
'In his "~c1cclic" approach. Dunning (19Kll) Iranslalcs lhc Ucckshcr-Ohlin nolion nfcomparalivc advamagc. which is
an allrihulc nfa nalional ccnnomy. imu "Iocalinnal advanl;lgc", Localinnal advamagc is nnl dircclly auachcd lo a lcrri-
Inry. hUI ralhcr lo ccrtain produclive assels fixcd lo Ihallcrrilory. Thc immnbilily of produclive assels (such as lahour)
undcrlics Ihis nolion nflocalinnal advanlagc.COUNTERTRADE AND STRATEGIC TRADING FORM 
Table 2. Choice of strategic trading form 
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Internation',d  Trade Commitments 
Access  Spot (Cash/Credit/no money)  Continuous (Contracts) 
Exclusive  Barter and barter-type forms  Internalization 
Shared  Market  Other countertrade forms 
Source: Adapted from Atik, J. (1993). 
failure in buying the machinery, since the selling firm will not be "paid" unless the machinery 
performs to specifications (Rugman and Hodgetts.  1995. p.  168). 
Assume.  however,  that  the  home  country  restricts  incoming  FDI.  and  is  either  unable  or 
unwilling to set up marketing networks abroad. Compensation and counterpurchase can serve as 
the next best route to effective marketing. By telling suppliers that they will import only if the 
supplier takes back and markets their products, countertraders can force suppliers to undertake 
marketing investments which they would not otherwise have done. The exporter who is forced 
to take back the countertrading country's products can be expected to make a greater commit- 
ment to nmrketing the goods, because  failure  to do so would jeopardize his  future sales. This 
is  a  way of substituting  fi~r hierarchical  coordination,  when  the  political  desire  for national 
sovereignty pushes towards inflows of FDI. 
As we have suggested above, each viable form of governance -- market, hybrid forms such 
as countcrtrade, hierarchy --  is defined by a series of attributes  that bear supporting relations. 
Among  the  intermediate  forms,  countertradc  m:ty be  a  superior  structure  when  it  comes  to 
exploiting  special  tr:tding  situations,  where  (i)  the  prospect  of ntarkct  failure  ntakes  spot- 
contracting unreliable;  (ii) access to assets can be viably shared  witht)ut general diffttsion; but 
where (iii) greater attention must be paid to prc,,;crving economic rents (Atik.  1993). 
A firm mttst obtain access to all the necessary traded assets: "'transactitms'" are the exchanges 
by which such access is obtained.* The access decision includes (i) whether recourse to the asset 
is  on a  spot (market-cash/credit  or barter-no  ,noncy) or a  continuous (contracting)  basis,  and 
fttrther, whether (ii) such access is to be exclusive or shared. 
Note that the spot/continuous access decision  fi~llows  Williamson's "fundamental  transfor- 
ntation":  where  markets  function  well,  spot  access  is  adequate;  where  markets  fail  (small 
ntnnbers)  continuous  use is  preferred  in order to reduce opportunisnt.  Consider the  following 
rnatrix: 
The  framework  includes  two  dimensions  by  which  access  to  traded  goods arc  obtained. 
The  first  dimension  expresses  whether  access  to an  input/output  is  on a  spot or a  long-term 
continuous  basis;  this  line  of analysis  is  consistent  with  transaction-cost  theory. The  second 
dimension decides whether access to the goods may be shared without destroying economic rents. 
Deciding wh:tt forth of countertrade to use fi~r entering up on an international  transaction  is 
more  complex  than  the  usually  proposed  decision  between  firm  or market.  Barter contracts 
reached under these circumstances are called spot-market contracts, because they govern goods 
or services that arc to be exchanged "'on tile spot". For more complex transactions thai extend 
*ilennart ( I tF)()) distinguishc~, mctht~Jx of organization (price sy~,lem vs. hierarchy ) from instiluti*mal choice. Thus, even 
when a Ix~lar institutional form is used. a mix of organizational methods will often hc observed. A  market transaction 
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failure in buying the machinery. since Ihe selling tinn will nol be "paid" unkss Ihe machinery
perfonns lo speciftcalions (Rugman and Hodgetts. 1995. p. 168).
Assume. however. Ihal Ihe home counlry reslricls incoming FDL and is eilher unable or
unwilling lo sel up markeling networks abroad. Compensalion and counterpurchase can serve as
Ihe next best roule to effeclive markeling. By telling suppliers Ihal Ihey will import only if Ihe
supplier lakes back and markels their products. countertraders can force suppliers to undertake
markeling inveslmenls which they would not olherwise have done. The exporter who is forced
lo lake back Ihe counlertrading counlry's products can be expecled to make a grealer commil-
ment lo markeling Ihe goods, because failure to do so would jeopardize his fUlure sales. This
is a way of subsliluting for hierarchical coordinalion, when Ihe polilical desire for national
sovereignlY pushes towards intlows ofFDL
As we have suggesled above, ea~:h viable form 01' govcrnance - market. hybrid forms such
as l..'ounlerlrade. hierarchy - is detined by a series of auribules Ihal bear supporting relalions.
Among Ihe ínlermediale fortns, l..'Oltnlerlrade rnay be a superior strul..'lure when il comes lo
exploiling spel..'ial Irading silualions, where (il Ihe prospel'l of markel failure makes spol-
l..'onlral..'ling unrcliable; (ii) access lo assels can be vi¡lhly sh¡lred wilhoul general diffus;on; huI
where (iii) grealer aUenlion musl be raíd lo preserving el..'onomic renls (Alik. 1l)l)Jl.
A firm musl oblain aCl..'ess lo alllhe necessary Iraded assels; "Iransaclions" are Ihe exchanges
by which such al..'l..'ess is oblained.*The ¡Il..'l..'ess del..'ision indudes (i l whelher rel..'lJllrse lo Ihe assel
is on a spol (markel-l..'ashkredil or bafler-no llIoney) or a l..'onlinuous (l..'Illllraclíngl basis, and
fUflher. whelher (ii l sUl..'h access is lo be exclusive or shared.
Nole thal Ihe spot!conlinuous access del..'ision follows Williamson's '"fundamenlallransfor-
malion": where markels fundion well, spol access is adequale; where markels fail (small
numbersl conlinuous use ís prcferrcd in order lo redul..'e 0ppoflunisrn. Consíder lhe following
malrix:
The framework includes Iwo dimensions by which access lo Iraded goods are oblained.
The lirsl dimension expresses whelher al..'cess lo an input!oulpUl ís on a Spol or a long-Ierm
contínuous oasis; Ihis linc 01' analysis is consistcnt wilh Iransal..'lion-cosl thcory. Thc second
dimcnsion decides whclheraccess lo Ihe goods may bc shared wilhoul destroying ewnomic rcnls.
Deciding whal form 01' counlCflradc 10 use for enlering up on an inlernational Iransaction is
more complex Ihan the usually proposed decision belween lirm or market. Barrer conlral..'ls
real..'hed under Ihesc: circumslances are callc:d spol-markel conlrads, hecause Ihc:y govern goods
or services lhal an: lo be c:xdwnged "on Ihe SpOI". For more cornplex Irans¡l\:tions lhal c:xlc:nd
'f1ennart (1 ')<)0' distinguishes methuds 01'organjzatinn (pricc syslcm ",'. hierarchy, from insljtutional choice. Thus. evcn
whcn a polar inslitulional forro is uscd. a mix oforganizalinnal mcthods will oflen be ohservcd. A markct transaetion
will predominantly rcly on Ihe prkc syslem. but may have hierarehical fcaturcs (j,e. behavioural controls) as well.116  D. CAMINO and C. CARDONE 
over time  a  relational  tbrm  of contracting,  which  does  not  attempt  the  impossible  task  of 
exclusive contracting but ~ttles instead for an agreement that frames the relationship, other CT 
forms  may  be  more  suitable.  Again,  continuous  access  to  an  asset  will  be  sought  where 
opportunism appears likely to arise: ownership of a productive asset (internalization) or long- 
term production  contracts  (buy-back, counterpurehase,  etc.)  necessarily  provides continuous 
access. 
However, there is another important dimension to consider: whether the access to the traded 
asset is exclusive or may be shared. If the spot versus continuous access decision reflects a min- 
imization of transaction costs, then the shared/exclusive access decision is driven by the desire 
to preserve imperfect competition. This matrix is thus perhaps more "eclectic" than the more 
purely transaction-cost explanations (Atik,  1993). 
A  firm demands exclusive access to those assets which  generate competitive advantages: 
proprietary technologies are the prime examples of such assets.* Other non-strategic assets may 
be profitably shared without dissipating rents. Certain goods, however, are best exploited through 
joint access, where by a limited number of firms share their use but jointly withhold use from all 
other market participants.t 
A  long-term  countertrade  contract  is  thus  on  the  same  basis  us  ownership,  providing 
continuous access to an asset, just as both ownership and long-term contracts suppress the need 
to bargain over a longer period. On the other hand, barter and barter-type methods, for instance, 
arise because  what  appears to be shared  use  is  in  fact a  spot transaction,  with  simultaneous 
exclusive  access  to  the  assets  for  the  companies  involved. Trade  arrangements  implying 
reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties. Other countertrade  forms 
(buy-back. counterpurchase, etc.) represent particular trading arrangements. They occur when 
(i) access to an asset is to be continuous ; when (ii) shared access is more efficient than exclusive 
access; but when (iii) countertrade is preferred to the market mechanism. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the most important developments in international trade over the last two decades has 
been the increase and widespread use of barter-like practices, usually known under the generic 
name of countertrade. According to economic theory, if money exists as a means of exchange, 
then given the superiority of money-mediated transactions, barter would be irrational. 
Competing theories arise, however, when it comes to explaining reciprocal trade under both 
perfect and imperfect competition. Several authors have attempted to explain the presence and 
increasing prevalence of these complex ftwms of international  transactions, using the standard 
ttmls of economic analysis. They show  that  in  many circumstances countertrade  is a  rational 
response to transaction costs, information asymmetries, moral hazard/agency problems and other 
market imperfections, simply representing a substitute for other more standard forms of market 
trade or internalization aimed at reducing transaction costs under the conditions outlined. 
*As  Dunning (1988) i~)ints out. the ov,'ncr~hip of an asset  is not irrelevant to its value. This makes an explicit link 
between ownership and kx:ational advantage. 
tShared use, it seems, can minimize transaction costs in certain circumstances, while simultaneously conversing the eco- 
nomic rents which these specific productive assets generate (Kogut.  1988. pp. 319-320). 
over time a relational form of contracting. whieh does not attempt the impossible task of
exclusive contracting but settles instead for an agreement that frames the relationship. other CT
forms may be more suitable. Again. continuous access to an asset will be sought where
opportunism appears likely to arise: ownership of a productive asset (internalization) or long-
term production contracts (buy-baek. counterpurchase. etc.) necessarily provides continuous
access.
However. there is another important dimension to consíder: whether the access to the traded
asset is exclusive or may be shared. Ifthe spot versus continuous access decision reflects a min-
imization of transaction costs. then lhe shared/exclusive access decision is driven by the desire
to preserve imperfeet competitíon. This malrix is thus perhaps more "eclectic" than the more
purely transaction-cost explanations (Atík. 1993).
A firm demands exclusive aceess to lhose assets whích generate eompetitive advantages:
proprietary technologies are the prime examples ofsueh assets.* Other non-strategic assets may
be profitablyshared wilhoutdissipaling rents. Certaingoods. however. are bestexploited through
joínt access. where by a limiled numberoffinns share their use butjoinlly withhold use from all
olher markct partieipants.t
A long-lero1 counlertrade eonlraet is lhus on lhe same basis us ownershíp. províding
eonlinuous aeeess to an assel. jusI as bolh ownership and long-lerm conlracls supprcss lhe need
to bargain over a longer periodo On lhe olher hand. barter and bartcr-type melhods. for inslanee.
arise beeause what appears to be shared use is in fael a spol transaelion. wilh simultaneous
exclusive aeeess lo lhe asseIs for lhe eompanies involved. Trade arrangemenls ímplying
reeiproeily can ¡liso be used lo equalize lhe exposure of lhe parties. Olher eounlertmde forms
(buy-bm:k. counlcrpun:hase. etc.) represenl particular Irading arrangements. They occur when
(i) access lo an assel is lo be conlinuous: when (íi) shared acccss is more eflicient Ihan exclusive
access; huI when (iii) eounlertradc is prcferred to thc markel mechanism.
6. SUMMARY ANO CONCLUOING REMARKS
One of Ihe mosl important dcvclopmcnts in inlernational Irade over Ihe last two decades has
been the increase and widespread use of barler-like practices. usually known under the generic
name of countertrade. According to economic thcory. if moncy exisls as a means ofexchange.
then given the superiority ofmoney-medialed lransaclíons. barter would be irrational.
Compeling theories arise. however. when il eomes lo explaining recíprocal trade under both
perfeet and impcrfect compelition. Several aulhors have attempted lo explain lhe presenee and
íncreasing prevalence of lhese complex forms of inlernalional transactíons, using the standard
tools of economic analysis. They show Ihal ín many circumstances countertrade is a rational
response lo lransaction cosls. informalion asymrnelries. moral hazard/agency problems and other
markel írnperfections. simply representing a substilule for other more standard forms of market
trade or inlernalizalion aimed at reducíng lransaction costs under the conditions outlíned.
"As Dunning (19XX) poinls oul. Ih.: nwn.:rship of an assel is nol irrelevanl lo ils valu.:. This makes an explicil link
belween ownership and 1'K:alional advantage.
tShared use. il seems, can minimil.e transaelionensls in eerlain cireumslam:es. while simuhaneouslyeonversing Ihe eeo-
nomie renls which Ihesc spceifie produetive assels generalc (Kogul. 191111. pp. 319-32()).COUNTERTRADE AND STRATEGIC TRADING FORM  i 17 
In this article we have looked at economic countertrade arrangements from a comparative 
institutional point of view, whereby cutting down transaction costs is seen as the key feature of 
this form of strategic trading. We argue that countertrade is not novel: nor is it a mixed case. 
Rather, it is a distinct type of institutional arrangement. Consequently in the organizational con- 
tinuum proposed by Williamson it is possible to construct and use a third (hybrid) institutional 
form which is congruent with transaction-cost theory. 
Hence, what distinguishes these complex forms of trading arrangements is the kind of trans- 
action effected (reciprocal trade), and the reason why they can minimize transaction costs more 
than internalization and market contracting. Each viable form of governance -- market, hybrid 
(countertrade), hierarchy m  is defined by a series of attributes that bear a  supporting relation- 
ship. 
This line of thought suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in 
situations where, due to asymmetric information, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent 
international trade from taking place. Other forms of countertrade such as buy-back, compensa- 
tion and counterpurchase on the other hand  will be used to avoid restrictions on FDI by host 
countries. In this context two of the  most common forms of countertrade,  compensation and 
counterpurchase, can be explained as attempts to build up reciprocity in order to reduce trans- 
action costs in the international marketplace for intermediate products, technology and distribu- 
tion services. Reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties in the case of 
buy-back agreements. 
Due to incomplete contracting or the absence of law enforcement, international trade imposes 
the great risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of trading partners. Countertradc is supposed 
to solve the moral-hazard problem by introducing a "hostage", which would be forfeit -- at any 
rate partly -- if either party cheats during the first transaction. For this construction to work the 
hostage has to be sufficiently valuable compared with the possible benefits of cheating. 
In order to explain agreements in terms of stable strategies we also developed the concept of 
organizational flexibility, based on the activation of learning activities between the countertrade 
partners ~  something which the transaction-cost explanation htiled to consider. The choice of 
trading h~rm is thus a response related to the value of the dynamic elements ofcountcrtrade agree- 
ments  as a  means  of learning  and  to  increase  future  freedom of choice  in  unpredictable  or 
changing  environments. Countertrade  will  then  be  regarded as  a  routine  process of creating 
complex agreements which constitute an institutional an institutional trading form. 
Barter and barter-type transactions can be explained in a framework where by access to the 
traded goods is on a spot but also an exclusive basis ~  a species of mutually exclusive spot 
contract in which no money is used. Other countertrade h~rms can be explained instead in that 
access to an input-output is continuous but can be shared without destroying economic rents. 
Nevertbelcss, although "'Considerable progress has been made in the last two years in devel- 
oping a theory of institutional choice based on the minimization of organizing costs" (Hennart, 
1994. p. 193), we do not claim to have presented a general theory of countertrade. Rather, we argue 
that some countertrade forms may often a superior trading structure for exploiting special situa- 
tions, where (i) the prospect of market failure means that spot contracting is unreliable; where (ii) 
access to assets can be viably shared without general diffusion; but where (iii) greater attention 
must be paid to preserving economic rents derived from the benefits of organizational flexibility. 
We therefore conclude that under certain circumstances ~  such as asymmetric information, 
host country restrictions on foreign investment, a rapidly changing environment ~  barter-like 
agreements and other forms of countertrade can represent a form of that minimizes transaction 
costs while also conserving the economic rents generated by these specific arrangements. 
In this article we have looked at economic countertrade arrangements from a comparative
institutional point ofview. whereby cutting down transaetion costs is seen as the key feature of
this form of strategic trading. We argue that countertrade is not novel; nor is it a mixed case.
Rather. it is a distínct type ofinstitutíonal arrangement. Consequently in the organizational con-
tínuum proposed by Williamson it is possible to construet and use a third (hybrid) institutional
form which is congruent with transaction-cost theory.
Hence. what distinguishes these complex forms oftrading arrangements is the kind oftrans-
action effected (reciprocal tcade), and the reason why they can minimize transaction costs more
than intemalization and market eontracting. Each viable form ofgovemance - market. hybrid
(countertradel. hierarchy - is defined by a series ofattributes that bear a supporting relation-
ship.
This line ofthought suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreemenls will be useful in
situalions where. due lo asymmelric informalion. high lransaction costs would otherwise prevent
intemational tcade from taking place. Olher forms ofcounlertrade sueh as buy-back. compensa-
lion and counlerpurchase on Ihe olher hand will be used lo avoid reslrictions on FDI by hosl
counlries. [n Ihis conlexl two of the most common forms of counlertrade. compensalion and
counlerpurehase. can be explained as attempts to build up reciprocily in order to reduce trans-
aclion cosls in lhe inlemational marketplace for inlermediate products. technology and distribu-
tion services. Reeiprocily can also be used lo equalize the exposure of lhe parties in the case of
buy-back agreemenls.
Due to ¡ncomplete contracting orthc abscm:c oflaw cnforcemcnt, inlemationallrade imposcs
lhe greal risk ofopportunislic behaviouron lhc part ofIrading partners. Counlertradc is supposed
to solve lhe moral-hazard problcm by inlroducing a "hoslagc", which would be forfeil - al any
rate partly - ifeither party eheats during thc lirsllransaclion. For Ihis conslruction lo work Ihe
hostage has lo be sufficiently valuable compared with lhe possiblc benelits 01' chealing.
In order lo explain agreemenls in lerms ofsl:,ble slralegies we also developed Ihe eoncepl of
organizalinnal flexibilily. based nn lhe aclivalion nI' learning aClivilics bclween Ihe COUnlertrade
partners - something which lhe Iransaclion-cosl explanalion f:\Íled lo considero The choice of
lrading form is Ihus a response relaled lo Ihe valueofIhe dynamieelemenlsofcounlerlrade agrec-
menls as a mcans of leaming and lo increase fUlure freedom of choice in unprediclable or
changing environmenls. Counlertrade will lhen be regarded as a rouline process of crealing
complex agrcemenls which conslilule an inslilulional an inslilulional Imding formo
Barler and barter-Iype Iransaclions can be explained in a framework wherc by access lo lhe
Iraded goods is on a spol bul also an exclusive basis - a species of mUlually exclusive spol
conlrael in which no money is used. Olher counlertrade forms can be explained inslead in Ihal
access lo an inpul-oulpUI is conlinuous bUI can be shared wilhoul deslroying economie rents.
Nevertheless, although "Considerable progress has been made in the last lwo years in devel-
oping a theory of inslitutional choice based on lhe minimizalion of organizing costs" (Hennart,
199-+, p. 193). we do nol daim lo have presenled a generallheory ofcounlertrade. Ralher, we argue
Ihal sorne counlertradc forms may often a superior Irading slruclurc for exploiling special silua-
lions. where (i) Ihe prospcct of markel failure means Ihat spot contracting is unreliable; where (ji)
access lo assels can be viably shared wilhoUI general diffusion; but whcre (iii) grealer altenlion
must be paid lo preserving economic renls derived from Ihe bcnetils oforganizalional flexibility.
We therefore condude that under certain circumstances - such as asymmelric informalion,
hosl counlry reslriclions on foreign investment. a rapidly changing environmenl - barter-like
agreements and olher forms ofcountcrtrade can represent a form of lhal minimizes lransaction
cosls while also conserving Ihe economic renls generaled by Ihese specilic arrangements.118  D. CAMINO and C. CARDONE 
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